Thematic Papers

Security Sector Reform in the Arab Region: Challenges to Developing an Indigenous Agenda

Yezid Sayigh

The manner in which Western practitioners, both governmental and non-governmental, have developed and promoted security sector reform as a field of policy has tended to emphasize its ‘technical’ aspects and so to de-politicize it, partly in an effort to make it more acceptable to governments, both of Western donor and Arab recipient countries. This has rendered it ineffective and irrelevant, and at times counter-productive and even dangerous. The security sector is the most closely bound to ruling elites and power structures; it is all about power relations, and to seek to reform it in any meaningful way is inevitably political and profoundly threatening to the established domestic order. SSR may bolster authoritarianism when its focus is on military modernization or narrow professionalisation rather than efforts to strengthen rule of law and democratic control.

This paper provides an analytical framework through which these questions may be approached. It considers SSR as an element of Western policy towards the Arab region, focusing in particular on the EU and US, and engages in a critical survey of its main normative and operational guidelines. It assesses the context for security sector reform in the Arab region, identifying general characteristics and trends and reinforcing the argument that SSR can only be approached as a fundamentally political challenge. The paper concludes with a summary of the principal aims and challenges confronting the promotion and implementation of SSR in the Arab region. Western policies demonstrate that SSR (not to mention democratization) in the Arab region will not be achieved from the outside, unless driven by powerful domestic actors. A particularly important and practical expression of the conceptual and cultural change needed in the Arab region would be to demilitarize internal security and police forces, and to enhance their capacity so as to enable the regular armed forces to be reoriented exclusively to the provision of external security. Demilitarization and functional differentiation are especially important for Arab governments engaging in political liberalization. Significantly, meaningful steps towards SSR have only been taken by governments undertaking democratization, however limited.

Any discussion of SSR needs to be situated within a broader debate about the meaning and practices of security, and the question of whose security is being provided.

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Security sector reform (SSR) has attained a relatively high profile in public discourse in some Arab countries in recent years. In large measure, this reflects the elevated status SSR has attained as both an instrument and an objective of policy for Western governments (most notably the UK, Netherlands, and Germany), regional bodies such as the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and international bodies such as the UN. Yet although SSR is often seen or portrayed as a Western imposed agenda, it is noticeable mostly for its absence from official Western discourse and policies towards the Arab region.

The manner in which Western practitioners, both governmental and non-governmental, have developed and promoted SSR as a field of policy has tended to emphasize its ‘technical’ aspects and so to de-politicize it, partly in an effort to make it more acceptable to governments, both of Western donor and Arab recipient countries. However, this has rendered it ineffective and irrelevant, and at times counter-productive and even dangerous. The security sector is the most closely bound to ruling elites and power structures; it is all about power relations, and to seek to reform it in any meaningful way is inevitably political and profoundly threatening to the established domestic order. In the Middle East, Arab governments have proved remarkably resilient and able to withstand any pressure to reform their security sectors – with the obvious exception of Iraq, Palestine, and, in a distant third place Lebanon, where the external role is predominant.¹

The above does not mean that SSR is not necessary, nor that it is not feasible. Rather, it underlines the following general observations. First, although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a genuine external role, SSR has succeeded nowhere except when driven primarily by domestic actors and backed by a domestic consensus. Second, SSR needs to be approached in a fundamentally different way, that draws on the historical specificities – institutional and constitutional arrangements, ‘defensive’ cultures, and so on – and politics of each country. Third, the principal purposes and objectives of SSR, and their normative assumptions, need to be clearly defined and appropriate to the specific context. Fourth, the question that must be addressed by would-be reformers in each particular case is how to bring about SSR without requiring the sort of circumstances that have placed it centrally on the national and internal agendas in Palestine and Iraq; can reform indeed be achieved, without radical change and upheaval? How might reform of the security sector be achieved peacefully? How to build supportive coalitions which by necessity must also involve the security sectors?

The principal aim of this paper is to provide an analytical framework through which these questions may be approached. To do so, first it briefly sets out the main elements of SSR: why it is important, what it involves operationally, and who it comprises and affects. Second, the paper considers SSR as an element of Western policy towards the Arab region, focusing in particular on the EU and US, and engages in a critical survey of its main normative and operational guidelines. It then assesses the context for security sector reform in the Arab region, identifying general characteristics and trends and reinforcing the argument that SSR can only be approached as a fundamentally political challenge. The paper concludes with a summary of the principal aims and challenges confronting the promotion and implementation of SSR in the Arab region.

Security Sector Reform: Why, what, who? Purpose, substance, actors

The emergence over the past decade of security sector reform (SSR) as both a concept and a field of expertise guiding policy formulation owes much to the focus of

Western governments and development agencies since the end of the Cold War on ‘poverty reduction’ in developing countries, and to the introduction of the notion of ‘human security’ in the 1994 Human Development Report published by the UN Development Program (UNDP). These shifts reflected growing awareness that the conventional focus on protecting states from military threats and on traditional security organizations and authorities overlooks broader security concerns affecting a wider range of societal groups, not least the poor, and that security institutions significantly affect national prospects for social and economic progress. Security sector reform renews attention to the impact of civil-military relations and of excessive, opaque, or inappropriate security expenditure, seen as directly impeding development and social welfare. Indeed, even from the conventional viewpoint, a poorly regulated or unprofessional security sector often compounds rather than mitigates security problems, as Dylan Hendrickson has correctly observed, and is therefore detrimental to effective government and political stability.

However, despite general agreement on the need for SSR, an important difference remains in whether its main objective is to improve the physical security of poor people, or to improve democratic control over decision-making in the security sector. Indeed, the difference in primary objectives is reflected in the variation of terms and perceptions employed to define SSR. As Michael Brzoska notes, some practitioners and analysts prefer to speak of ‘transformation’ rather than reform (Chuter 2002, Cooper and Pugh 2002), while the UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery refers more expansively to ‘justice and security sector reform’, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has switched terms to ‘security system reform’. This variation is naturally reflected in the operational approaches proposed to put SSR into practice; the elements regarded as essential to SSR vary, as do the emphasis and level of priority accorded to each. Nonetheless, while the principal difference has not been resolved, there is broad agreement on an inclusive list of main areas of activity and general principles of SSR (see Appendices 1 and 3). Alex Bellamy usefully distils these into three generic areas of concern:

• Control: Establishing civilian and democratic control over instruments of lethal force. This involves making security forces accountable to democratically elected civilian authorities; general adherence to the rule of law—both domestic and international; making the security sector adhere to the same principles of financial management and transparency as the non-security sector; creating and embedding clear lines of authority which establish civilian and democratic control of the military; building capacity within civilian government and civil society to scrutinize defense policy and creating an environment conducive to the participation of civil society in security matters; and ensuring that the training of professional soldiers is in line with the requirements of democratic societies.

• Capacity: Security sector reform aims to create professional armed forces that are able to fulfil their functions (which consist primarily of the provision of internal and external security) in an effective, efficient and

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2 The OECD makes the connection between poverty and SSR explicit, arguing that “One factor that contributes to insecurity, particularly for the poor, is a poorly-managed and poorly-motivated ‘security system’”. From Foreword by DAC Chairman Richard Manning, in Development Advisory Committee (DAC), Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD, 2004, p. 3.


5 Point made by Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, Occasional Paper No. 4, Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2003, p. 23.

legitimate manner. It also aims to create systems of security governance that have a sufficient level of expertise and capacity to implement the security policies of governments in efficient and effective ways.

- **Cooperation**: Reducing regional and internal security dilemmas by reorienting organizations, promoting confidence, and establishing cross-border working partnerships, not least in order to confront increasingly transnational threats.\(^7\)

It is moreover clear from the preceding that a wide range of social and institutional actors are affected by SSR, and actually or potentially involved in implementing it. Drawing on a document prepared by the Development Advisory Committee (DAC) of the OECD in 2001, Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake identify these as:

...the security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions) and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defense Ministry, etc.).\(^8\)

The DAC, echoed by other development agencies and SSR practitioners and advocates, subsequently expanded the list also to encompass “civil society, including human rights organisations and the press.”\(^9\)

However, David Chuter objects that these definitions of the security sector “make any serious SSR program impossibly large and complex, and turn SSR questions themselves into more general questions of ‘governance’.”\(^10\) A UN Security Council briefing paper issued in February 2007 offers a considerably narrower definition, stating that “the term *security sector* is now being used to describe institutions legitimately entitled to intervene in society, using force if necessary to protect citizens, uphold law and order and state institutions, and protect the borders of the state.”\(^11\) Chuter offers a convincing balance, defining the security sector as consisting “of all those institutions whose primary role is the provision of internal and external security, together with bodies responsible for their administration, tasking and control. In practice, this means the military, the police, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces and the government agencies responsible for them.”\(^12\)

Chuter’s intermediate definition will be used for the main part in this paper, but these contending views are nonetheless useful for two reasons. On the one hand, the broader, more inclusive definition of the security sector is important because it places the fundamentally political issue of *governance* of the security sector at the centre of SSR. This is of particular importance when discussing the case of the Arab region, where the security sector functions as a “privileged and influential power centre” and has often thwarted prospects for social, economic, and political change.\(^13\) On the other hand, the narrower definition is a useful reminder that the ultimate purpose of SSR efforts and programs is to bring about specific structural, complex definitions.

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\(^12\) Chuter, ‘Understanding Security Sector Reform’, p. 7. He also objects, with some justification, that SSR literature is too often the product of those without personal experience of, or frequent contact with, the security sector or politics on the one hand, or without deep regional expertise on the other. *Ibid*, p. 2.

procedural, and attitudinal changes in the agencies and institutions that deploy coercive means and power on behalf of the state. The question that the SSR literature has largely failed to answer, however, is how to pursue any of these objectives in concrete political situations, and, given its predominantly Western normative and practical elements, how to transform SSR from an external agenda into a domestic one.

SSR in Western policy towards the Arab region

There can be little doubt that, if SSR has entered public discourse or been placed on the national agenda in any Arab country to date, then this is only as a result of Western inputs and influences. SSR has yet to become a domestically-driven demand or process anywhere in the Arab region, with the exception of a few, modest efforts by non-governmental advocates, media, and, in even rarer cases, parliamentarians. In no case has an Arab government embarked on SSR willingly, nor done so through its own genuine or sustained initiative. This is only underlined by the handful of instances in which significant restructuring of security institutions has actually taken place or been attempted – Palestine, Iraq, and, to a considerably lesser extent, Lebanon; in each of these countries Western governments have led international efforts to address a profound security deficit by providing direct assistance and training security personnel.14

However, the common perception of SSR as a Western imposed agenda is seriously misleading. This is not to say that external actors do not have a useful contribution to make to SSR in Arab countries, nor that any interventions they may make in this field are necessarily illegitimate; quite the contrary, the extensive and intricate nature of relations between Arab and Western governments in all fields – not least security – suggests that both sides should indeed engage in constructive dialogue and practical cooperation relating to SSR. Rather, what is most striking is just how little effort Western governments have in fact made to promote, let alone to implement, SSR in the Arab region, certainly outside of the three cases mentioned above. This omission is, if anything, a serious failure on both sides.

The low profile of SSR, bordering on complete absence, is evident from a survey of Western policies towards the Arab region. The following section first summarizes the context of Western policy formulation and then discusses the EU approach to SSR promotion in the region, before commenting briefly on the US approach and then critically assessing these Western policies in practice.

Mainstreaming SSR

At its broadest, the context of Western policy formulation has been shaped by a number of inter-related developments since the end of the Cold War: the experience of UN peacekeeping actions, which presented new challenges of post-conflict construction, not least in the security sector; expansion of the EU and NATO to include former Soviet-bloc countries, requiring harmonization of values and practices regarding democratic control, human rights, and rule of law in the security sector; the involvement of international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, in demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of former combatants, and the emerging view that justice and legal reform are needed for development; and the new, explicit assertion of the link between development, security, and normative values made by principal Western bodies such as the EU, OECD, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and UK Department for International Development (DFID).15


However, because the initial focus was on post-conflict and post-authoritarian cases, there were no moves to apply the emerging thinking about SSR to the Arab region during the 1990s. The single exception was the international effort to help construct the Palestinian Authority’s new police force from 1994 onwards, but this was not explicitly framed in terms of SSR, even though it sought to attain much the same governance norms, professional benchmarks, and institutional capacities.\(^{16}\)

The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about a shift in the Western policy stance, though the results have been meagre, and indeed decidedly mixed. On the one hand, the US administration led the way at the level of official discourse: in December 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a ‘Middle East Partnership Initiative’ centred on bringing about significant across-the-board reform in Arab and Middle East governments. The G-8 subsequently followed up with a ‘Partnership for Progress and a Common Future in the Broader Middle East and North Africa’ region, and in June 2004 published a Plan of Support for Reform and invited regional ministers to discuss practical ways forward.\(^{17}\) Of potentially greater importance was the EU response in 2004 to the US ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’, which took the form of a proposed ‘Strategic Partnership’ between the EU its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern counterparts.\(^{18}\) However, these initiatives have not led to any tangible or sustained political efforts or programmatic action in any field of reform, let alone SSR. On the other hand, in practice 9/11 prompted a shift in the emphasis of Western policy in the region away from the promotion of democracy and human rights back to the previous, Cold War-era focus on stability, as yet another security imperative took precedence over liberalization.\(^{19}\)

The gap between Western rhetoric and practice towards the Arab region is particularly well illustrated by EU policy, which continues to prefer “a long-term, cautious approach in the name of preserving short-term stability”.\(^{20}\) Yet this stance is not entirely consistent with EU policy elsewhere; as Volkan Aytar and Eduard Soler i Lecha observe, SSR (especially democratic control of armed forces) became part of the EU’s ‘Copenhagen criteria’ in 1993 and has since been incorporated in its enlargement policy during accession or pre-accession negotiations of candidate countries.\(^{21}\) Furthermore, in 1995 the EU also adopted a human rights and development clause that stipulated suspension of aid to recipient countries in case of serious violations, which is now standard language in EU agreements with third parties.\(^{22}\) None of this was specific or directly relevant to the Arab region, but as Mona Yacoubian notes, in parallel the EU refocused its relations with Mediterranean


\(^{18}\) Hänggi and Tanner, Promoting Security Sector Governance..., p. 72.


\(^{21}\) The EU Policies of SSR Promotion in the Mediterranean, draft, Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut, 2006, pp. 5-6.

\(^{22}\) Yacoubian, ‘Promoting Middle East Democracy’, p. 4.
(and other Middle East) countries following the end of the Cold War on issues of migration, energy dependence, security and counterterrorism, and trade. The scope was there, but SSR did not make its way into the Barcelona Declaration that officially launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in November 1995. Nor has it in any subsequent EU document, partnership, or initiative relating to the Arab region.

**The EU and Arab SSR: the missing component of policy**

The closest that the EU has come to addressing SSR in the Arab context is through the commitment in the Barcelona Declaration to “develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems”, but the *acquis* otherwise has no language on security governance. This gap has not been filled in the 12 years since then; despite growing acknowledgement and practical experience of SSR in other regions – notably Africa and the Balkans – the 2005 Euro-Mediterranean summit once again excluded SSR from its new five-year work program. Indeed, even the commitment undertaken in the Barcelona Declaration to promote democracy and rule of law has been no more than nominal. Although one of the three ‘baskets’ it set up was political (the other two being economic and cultural), less than one percent of EMP funding in the early years was earmarked for activities relating to political reform. For its part MEDA Democracy, which was established in 1996 and then in 2001 folded into the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIHDR, established in 1994), has focused mostly women’s and children’s rights, rather than democracy, and had very little direct contact with Arab NGOs, the main exceptions being secular, pro-Western ones. Even a cursory look at MEDA regional program documents shows that, although Enhancing Rule of Law and Good Governance is one of five ‘priority areas’, only judicial reform and fighting criminality are identified as explicit concerns and aims; democratization and human rights, let alone SSR, are not mentioned once.

As Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner have argued, the omission of SSR in the EMP could have been corrected in the European Neighborhood Policy, in particular through the bilateral Action Plans it has agreed with a number of southern Mediterranean countries. However, although in rare cases these refer to SSR-related issues – upgrading police capabilities and judicial reform – SSR in any genuine sense has remained absent from all except the Action Plan with the Palestinian Authority. Similarly, rather than seek to introduce SSR through the new Justice and Home Affairs pillar of EMP, the EU has instead used it to press its counterparts to clamp down on illegal migration. In marked contrast to its failure to fund democracy or human rights promotion at any significant level, let alone promote SSR, in 2005 the EU set up a €250mn package to fund anti-migration measures in third party countries, and came very close to decreeing a full cut-off of trade and aid against countries that

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25 Yacoubian, ‘Promoting Middle East Democracy’, pp. 5 and 7. EMP funding is channeled via MEDA (EC Assistance Program for Mediterranean Countries) in seven-year cycles, the current one being 2007-2013, and is worth €1bn annually, spent mostly on economy and trade.
28 Aytar and i Lecha, *The EU Policies of SSR Promotion*, p. 17. Curiously, it is almost impossible to obtain information about British and French SSR-type activities in Lebanon, and there is no evidence of parliamentary or civil society consultation and participation although these are regarded as good SSR practice.
failed to deliver. Relatively large judicial reform projects have been launched in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia since 2002 (totalling €73mn by 2004), but the EU’s main interest has been to combat undocumented migration from, or via, these countries. Accordingly, such assistance as has been provided to local police forces – whether in the form of funding, training, or equipment – has centered on improving their ability to monitor borders and prevent smuggling of people and goods.

The concern with illegal migration, rather than police reform, has done much to shape the EU’s political agenda towards these counterparts. This, along with commercial and strategic interests (such as rewarding political support for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process), goes far in explaining why the EU has tacitly tolerated backsliding by Arab governments or relieved them of their obligations on democratic reforms. Fear of Islamist takeover of parliament and state institutions in Arab countries has been a factor since the Algerian military pre-empted the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992, and since 9/11 EU member-states have in effect ignored the fact that local states have tightened anti-terror laws and policies in ways that violate human rights, contrary to recommendations from the European Commission to balance anti-terror legislation with greater respect for democracy and human rights.

There is considerable justification, therefore, for the stark conclusion drawn by Aytar and Lecha, that the absence of explicit political or programmatic commitments to SSR means that:

- both the EMP and the ENP seem to ignore many central principles related to democracy. Firstly, the abuse of power by uncontrolled security units threatens the security of citizens. Secondly, the democratic control of the security sector is an essential part of the democratization processes. Thirdly, good practices, good governance and transparency efforts should be extended to the security field.

In the absence of such explicit references or commitments to SSR, moreover, the three EU documents that form a ‘strategic umbrella’ for its democracy-promotion strategy since 2003 and that are intended to frame its dialogue and action with its southern neighbours, are unlikely to generate much change. Between them the European Security Strategy (December 2003), Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World (December 2003), and the Interim Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (March 2004) set political, economic, and social reform as main aims, identify eleven key objectives including promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law, and sharpen the policy tools to help achieve these goals, combining traditional incentives with aid conditionality and targeted trade. However, the continuing predominance of trade and economic liberalization issues and weakness of any policy instruments or initiatives to tackle democratic governance seem to confirm Yacoubian’s net assessment that the EMP has not been about political reform, but about creating a cordon sanitaire – buying stability rather than laying the groundwork for change. The absence of SSR from the EU agenda only reinforces this conclusion.

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30 Hänggi and Tanner, Promoting Security Sector Governance, pp. 73-75.
31 Following years of Italian pressure, the EU lifted its ban on arms sales to Libya in 2004, in the expectation that this would enable it to exercise more effective border control. Ibid, p. 75.
32 Youngs, European Policies for Middle East Reform, p. 15. Yacoubian points out that Egypt received a disproportionate amount of EU aid despite its poor human rights record due to its role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. ‘Promoting Middle East Democracy’, p. 8.
33 Huber, Governance, Civil Society and Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, pp. 12, 14, and 15.
34 The EU Policies of SSR Promotion, pp. 17-18.
The US and Arab SSR: a counter agenda

The inference that, from the perspective of Western governments, SSR might come at the expense of their strategic priorities is at least as true of the US as it is of EU member-states. Referring to prospects for SSR in the Gulf Cooperation Council grouping, for example, the convenors and participants of a workshop organized by the Henry L. Stimson Centre in February 2006 acknowledged that transparency, oversight, and public debate may slow or block arms deals, acquisition of basing rights, and conduct of joint military exercises. Indeed, although USAID was arguably something of a pioneer among Western development agencies in noting the impact of civil-military relations and was already stressing the combination of security, justice, and legal reform in its work by the mid-1990s, the US has tended to view SSR with some suspicion, as a European centre-left project. USAID has generally focused on parliamentary training and judicial reform, therefore, rather than SSR properly speaking. The US focus on increasing military effectiveness and force modernization has only become more pronounced as counter-terrorism training has moved to the top of its priorities since 9/11. This has come specifically at the expense of activities regarded as critical to improve security sector governance, such as strengthening overall state capacity for planning and policy development, management of security expenditure, and civilian expertise in security matters.

The preceding is nowhere more evident than in Iraq, where the US has had extraordinary leeway in setting the agenda for the reconstruction of the entire Iraqi security sector, as well as considerable influence over related areas of legal, judicial, and penal reform. Yet, as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) concluded in late 2005, there has been no comprehensive SSR in Iraq, and the US focus remains on ‘hard’ security issues, to the neglect of ‘soft’ security issues of governance and control. A parallel assessment prepared by the RAND Corporation for the US Office of the Secretary of Defense added that, despite the creation of a Ministerial Committee on National Security in mid-2004, there was “little sign yet of the development of true coordination between ministries at working levels, facilitated by a national security advisory staff”. Two years later, there is still “no Iraqi or US plan that goes beyond platitudes for ministerial reform nor agreement on the character or mission of the police”.

Although the Iraqi government, parliament, and political parties must now bear an important share of responsibility for the manner in which the security sector and its governance are evolving, the impact of US pre- and post-war planning and policies cannot be under-estimated. A stark example is the disagreement between US Department of Justice trainers, who have tried to create a community-oriented law enforcement service, while US military authorities have tried to...

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39 DAC, Development Advisory Committee (DAC), Security System Reform and Governance, pp. 31 and 33-35.
41 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience, RAND, 2005, p. xi.
create a counter-insurgency force; the ultimate result, as the independent commission established by the US Congress noted in its final report of 6 September 2007, is a National Police that is operationally ineffective and not viable in its current form, while the ministry of interior “exists in name only” and is dysfunctional, sectarian, and corrupt. Yet the ministry oversees civil security forces whose total strength stood at 324,000 as of July 2007 — not counting 140,000 personnel in the Facilities Protection Service, which may be brought under the ministry — reflecting the extent to which the “hierarchical, patronage-based stovepipes” that the RAND assessment warned of in 2005 have become a reality. Even the ministry of defense, which is building the necessary institutions and processes and is regarded as a relative success story, is “hampered by bureaucratic inexperience, excessive layering, and over-centralization” and experiences difficulties executing budgets, contracting efficiently, accounting for personnel, and sharing information.

It is very evident that the US has engaged exclusively in ‘force transformation’ or ‘restructuring’ and counter-insurgency in Iraq, and has consistently avoided both the formulation and the priorities of an SSR program. Yet the principal lesson that emerges from the US experience in Iraq is the need to “institutionalize key reform processes”. As the 2005 RAND assessment explains, it is “vital to invest in the security sector intangibles that cannot be so easily quantified. These include the development of joint judicial and police investigatory capabilities, institutional development of national security institutions and the ministries of defense and interior, development of coordinated intelligence structures, and sustained support to the justice sector, including anticorruption programs.”

A more recent analysis by one of the earlier report’s key authors notes that the ministry of interior is expected at one and the same time to undertake “a massive program of recruitment, training and equipping”, “a leading role in conducting intensive counter-insurgency operations and to manage an explosion of organized criminality and gangsterism”, and also “massive modernization programs, such as the introduction of eMinistry and of new national ID cards, that have challenged established bureaucracies in the West”. It is moreover expected to do so “under three sets of broader, structural problems”: a weak criminal justice system, poor broader public administrative systems, and “a high degree of legal and constitutional uncertainty”.

In short, the Iraqi case demonstrates graphically just why an SSR approach is so badly needed, and how fundamentally it differs from force restructuring.

That the US has been consistently reluctant to adopt an SSR approach is also evident from the Palestinian case. Even in 1994-2000, the principal period of institution and capacity-building in the Palestinian Authority, the US “stayed largely aloof from the donor-sponsored police training efforts”, while establishing itself as the leading provider of training and non-lethal assistance to the Palestinian Authority’s Preventive Security apparatus, channelled mainly through the Central Intelligence Agency.

Here, too, political and strategic considerations predominated: US assistance was linked exclusively to counter-terrorism and assurance of Israeli security, and throughout

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44 Figure for personnel from ibid, pp. 86-87. Quote from Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. xi.
46 Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, pp. xii and xviii.
47 Andrew Rathmell, Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why is Reform of the Ministry of Interior so Hard?, PCR Project Special Briefing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, pp. 3-4.
this period the US administration actively opposed the imposition of greater transparency and accountability, in order to grant Palestinian Authority President Yassir Arafat broader discretion to act against Islamist and other opponents of the Oslo Accords without fear of judicial process or oversight by parliament or human rights organizations.

Nor has the US approach changed significantly since the ‘Quartet’ of the UN, US, Russia and the EU made Palestinian reform a central requirement in the ‘roadmap to peace’ it published on 30 April 2003. The US has continued to focus exclusively on upgrading the operational capability of select Palestinian security services – principally the Presidential Guard since 2006 – in pursuit of its anti-Islamist agenda, to the detriment of Palestinian legislative and constitutional development. Even before the Islamist Resistance Movement (Hamas) won the parliamentary elections in January 2006, the US Security Coordinator’s team (USSC) mission refused to coordinate or share information about its activities with its Quartet partners, although its program nominally formed part of a single SSR framework with the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories and Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL-COPPS) and with the UK mission assisting the development of security sector-related legislation. Besides contributing to the fragmentation of the Palestinian Authority and increased levels of violence, the US approach has moreover led to the direct reversal of one of the EU’s most sought-after reforms, namely retrenchment of the Palestinian security sector, for which it provided the bulk of budgetary support until 2006. Having risen by 19,321 new recruits from March 2005 to reach a strength of 73,000 by February 2006, the sector grew further to 86,817 by February 2007 as it absorbed large numbers of Fatah militants under the regime-change strategy pursued by the US administration against the Hamas government.

**Western approaches: A net assessment**

The Iraqi and Palestinian cases reflect exceptional circumstances, not least that SSR, and indeed state-building more generally, has had to proceed amidst high levels of insecurity and violence, but this does not mean that the problematic traits they reveal in Western approaches are not common. Not least of these is that tensions between EU and US approaches may undermine joint reform efforts; indeed the EU and US may disagree on whether or not to engage with particular countries at all. The EU was initially hopeful that the new Hamas government in the Palestinian Authority would prove more determined and successful than its Fatah-led predecessor to implement SSR, for example, but US insistence on ‘restructuring’ the Palestinian security services to suit its regime change strategy impeded implementation of the efforts of EUPOL-COPPS and the UK missions to promote democratic reform of the security sector, as well as reversing security

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51 Figure for the increase in 2005-2006 based on official documents cited on Mideastwire, 6 June 2006; and total strength given by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, cited in *Haaretz*, 28 February 2006. Figure for strength in February 2007 taken from ‘Building Effective and Accountable Security Sector for Palestine: Reform and Transformation’, Palestinian Security Team, February 2007. Draft presentation viewed by author. This figure does not include the 6,000 men of the Hamas ‘Executive Force’ who were added to the payroll during the period of national government in March-June 2007.

sector retrenchment. The preceding illustrates two particular problems affecting Western approaches to SSR in the Arab region, and indeed elsewhere. The first of these is the general lack of effective or sustained coordination among Western governments and multilateral agencies working on SSR. This does not relate to EU-US coordination alone: even within the EU, member-states continue to act to opposite effects in relation to democracy and human rights issues, despite the requirement made in official communications of the European Commission in 2001 and 2003 and in the European Security Strategy (2003) for a more active, capable and coherent policy harmonizing the EU’s many policies and instruments. Indeed, Damian Helly regards lack of coordination and coherence as “the biggest challenge to effective EU engagement in SSR”. Divergence is partly because some donor governments fear that SSR is about increasing military effectiveness and counter-terrorism, rather than justice and development; some development agencies and international financial institutions face legal restraints in getting involved in the security sector; and some donors prefer to work with certain security services and not others.

There is also a strong tendency, especially for governments that have to be responsive to their tax-payers, to fund discrete, one-off or stand-alone SSR projects rather than broad programs, and also specific activities with concrete outputs rather than process-based work (developing dialogue, consensus, policy), both because progress is more easy to verify and to avoid costly long-term commitments. Donors tend to reduce risk to themselves, narrow the operational terrain to protect their interests, and define tangible and changeable goals so as to persuade others to join or endorse their efforts. So even when Western government or development agencies jointly fund SSR projects, the common trend is towards short-termism and, no less significantly, to conduct work ad hoc rather than ground it in integrated and binding policy frameworks. Add to this the tendency to wage inter-departmental or inter-agency conflict over targets and priorities (between the World Bank and UN regional offices, for example), to commit insufficient resources to implement goals, and to focus on politically non-contentious tasks (such as de-mining) rather than tougher issues, and the challenges to an effective Western input to SSR in Arab (or other) countries mount still further.

The lack of coordination is evidently exacerbated by competing interests among Western governments and agencies. This highlights the second problem affecting their approach to SSR, which is that active promotion of SSR, not to mention of democracy and human rights more generally,
may conflict with their other policies and priorities in the Arab region. Most notably, several analysts argue that Western SSR promotion often clashes with Western arms export policies; indeed, different ministries of the same government may work to cross purposes.\textsuperscript{61} Chris Smith broadens the perspective in observing that active Western pursuit of trade opportunities, as well as arms supply, may give contrary signals in relation to SSR and other areas of democratic reform.\textsuperscript{62} Western interest in securing contracts for the sale or arms, training and follow-on support, and strategic protection remains paramount – most prominently in the GCC – and explains the continuing Western tendency to give defence modernization the pride of place within programs presented under the SSR rubric. In the post-9/11 era, moreover, there has been a distinct shift in Western policies as Louise Anderson notes, from improving states (making them more responsive to citizens) to strengthening them (making them more capable), and consequently SSR is increasingly being recast in terms of its role in enhancing counter-terrorism.\textsuperscript{63}

In summary, Western policies towards SSR in the Arab region are piecemeal, disjointed, and at times contradictory. The various, often disparate projects and programs that are initiated or funded in the name of SSR have not once added up to a coherent approach. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this is the occasional resort by Western advocates of more active engagement by their governments in SSR to “fitting everything under the heading of SSR”, which, Herbert Wulf warns, amounts to “nothing more than a re-labelling of work to date.”\textsuperscript{64} Their aim is to demonstrate to Western decision-makers that they are already extensively engaged in SSR-related activities, and so to persuade them to adopt SSR more formally and systematically. The listing by Malcolm Chalmers of EU activities that fit under the SSR rubric in his Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: an EU Perspective (2000) is an example of such advocacy, but has clearly not influenced EU policy in the Arab region. The Henry L. Stimson Center workshop cited previously was evidently moved by a similar spirit in suggesting that its list of functional areas that NATO could help GCC member-states improve – mostly related to military reform or defence modernization, as distinct from SSR – “could amount to security sector reform”.\textsuperscript{65}

\textbf{Arab security sectors: problematic control, capacity, and cooperation}

If the preceding assessment of Western policies serves a purpose, then it is to demonstrate that SSR (not to mention democratization) in the Arab region will not be achieved from the outside, unless driven by powerful domestic actors. Failing this, as Bellamy argues, any progress achieved will lack substance and remain malleable.\textsuperscript{66} Indeed, since the end of the Cold War genuine and lasting SSR has occurred only where a strong domestic consensus allowed the formulation of comprehensive and integrated

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Wulf, Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries, p. 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Laipson et al, Security Sector Reform in the Gulf, p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} ‘Security Sector Reform’, p. 114.
\end{itemize}
reform frameworks, specifically in the post-Soviet countries after 1989 and post-apartheid South Africa after 1994; as Robin Luckham points out, it is the sequence of ‘third wave’ democratization in Latin America in the 1980s followed by these cases, that really pioneered the way for SSR, before the term became fashionable in Western official discourse. Accordingly, this section first surveys the general trends and patterns affecting governance of the security sector in the Arab region, in terms of the three generic areas proposed by Bellamy and cited previously: control, capacity, and cooperation. It then analyses the challenges and obstacles that the particular position of the security sector (broadly defined) in the state-society relationship poses to developing and pursuing domestic SSR agendas in Arab countries.

Drawing on Bellamy, the principal outputs of SSR may be summarized further as follows:

1) Control: making security forces accountable to democratically elected civilian authorities and ensuring their general adherence to the rule of law; applying the same principles of financial management and transparency to all branches of the security sector as to the rest of government; and building capacity within government and civil society to scrutinize defense policy, expenditure, and performance.

2) Capacity: developing a professional security sector that is able to fulfill its internal and external security responsibilities in an effective, efficient and legitimate manner; clarifying the mandates and powers and the functional differentiation of all branches of the security sector; and creating systems of governance for the sector with a sufficient level of expertise and resources to implement the security policies of the government.

3) Cooperation: reorienting security organizations in terms of core missions and professional attitudes; promoting new cultures of confidence-building with local society and neighboring countries; and enhancing ability to confront new threats.

Control

It may be argued that a number of Arab states have sought, and to some extent succeeded, in securing at least some of these SSR outputs. This is especially true in relation to enhancing the professionalism and technical efficiency of certain of their security services – most often, though not exclusively, the armed forces – and to cooperation with Western and, on rarer occasions, regional counterparts. The conference of Arab police and security chiefs held in the Lebanese capital Beirut in October 2007 gave a clear example of this trend: its agenda, which included references to human rights in penal and security reform, focused on establishing an electronic database for Arab police forces for combating money laundering and terrorist funding, and on modernizing these forces to confront “intellectual property theft, corruption, human trafficking, illegal migration and drug trafficking.” But increased professionalism and modernization have not necessarily translated into improved adherence to human rights standards, accountability to democratically-elected civilian oversight bodies, or greater financial transparency.

Taking the above package of outputs as a whole, it is evident that no Arab country has embarked on, let alone achieved, significant SSR. As Laipson and others have noted, most Arab states have developed strong security institutions that have proven loyal to incumbent regimes, endowing the latter with


an ability to resist change that should not be underestimated. The result, as the ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ indicators compiled by various organizations such as the UNDP and Freedom House confirm, is that 13 of 19 Arab countries are in the bottom category worldwide of ‘not free’, the remaining six being only ‘partly free’.

Yasar Qatarneh encapsulates the general Arab dilemma in his assessment of civil-military relations in Jordan, one of the ‘partly-free’ category. The kingdom possesses “on paper at least, the battery of formal mechanisms via which, it is claimed, civilian control over the armed forces is ensured”, but in reality there are no “constitutional provisions regulating the functions of the armed forces, parliamentary defense committees, public accounts committees, audit and exchequer acts, internal audits and service regulations. In Jordan, neither a ministry of defence and military ombudsman systems exist”. What is needed is “the abolition of state security courts usually used to try political crimes and ending the budgetary autonomy of the military by making the usually-independent national security planning and budgeting process subject to parliamentary oversight and review”. What is true of the regular military is largely true of the rest of the security sector, that is, the police, intelligence services, and paramilitary and auxiliary forces, in the Arab region.

With certain variations and partial exceptions, control of the security sector reflects particularly acutely the concentration of executive power in Arab states. In common with many genuine democracies, virtually all Arab heads of state are constitutionally defined as the supreme commander of national armed forces. However, the control they exercise is frequently effective rather than nominal, in the sense that it extends to political oversight and beyond, to having the military (and often the intelligence services, and occasionally even the internal security forces) report directly to them. This is moreover as true of the Arab region’s monarchies as of its republics: in Saudi Arabia King Abdullah heads the National Guard and its intelligence branch while his half brothers Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz and Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz are Minister of Defence and Aviation and Minister of Interior respectively – and thus control the armed forces and wide range of internal security agencies – and his nephew Nawaf bin Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz heads the General Intelligence Presidency (previously named the General Intelligence Directorate). Much the same is true throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council, where civilian control may be deemed absolute, but only because ruling families directly control the security services. The Jordanian and Moroccan monarchs also exercise direct effective control over their armed forces and intelligence agencies, as well as playing a critical role in the oversight of internal security services.

Control is no less personalized in a number of Arab republics: Egyptian president Hosni 72

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70 Ibid, p. 104.
72 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, The Saudi Security Apparatus: Military and Security Services – Challenges and Developments, Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper No. 147, August 2004, pp. 5 and 6. Internal security agencies comprise the General Security Services, Public Security Administration Forces, Civil Defense Forces, Border Guard, Coast Guard, Passport & Immigration Division, Mujahideen Forces, Drug Enforcement Forces, Special Security Forces, and General Investigative Bureau, not counting the “Mutawwai’in” religious police who answer to the King in conjunction with the Islamic clergy, and known formally as the Organization to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, or Committees for Public Morality.
Mubarak exercises direct control over policy and key appointments and is the arbiter of disputes over mandates and of expenditure in the armed forces and intelligence services in particular, as is also the case with his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Asad, while in Yemen several of the sons, nephews, and male in-laws of President Ali Abdullah al-Saleh command key security forces and military districts, and in Libya, at the extreme end of the spectrum, President Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi as head of the ‘revolutionary sector’ (comprising the ‘Revolutionary Leadership’ and Revolutionary Committees) effectively determines key decisions concerning all branches of the security sector.\textsuperscript{73}

It follows that government cabinets and ministers wield little real authority over the security sector in most Arab countries, though the lack of control is particularly acute in relation to the armed forces, rather than internal security. When defence ministers are not members of ruling families, as in most GCC member-states, they are usually powerless to exercise any effective control or meaningful oversight over any aspect of the conduct of the armed forces, including setting policies and budgets, making key appointments, or deciding operational plans and procurement needs. In Egypt the defence ministry is “run by the military” while in Algeria a 1999 presidential decree effectively cancelled the post of defense minister in all but name and made the military independent of all civilian control.\textsuperscript{74} President Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika also became defense minister, a pattern repeated in Jordan, where the prime minister has customarily held the defense portfolio since 1970. So although the Jordanian minister of defense supposedly manages the armed forces and issues all decisions relating to defence policy, and chairs the Defence Council that formulates plans general policy, operational plans, procurement needs, and so on, it is the king who actually decides all these matters, and it is to him alone that the army chief-of-staff answers. No less importantly, despite the formal delegation of the defence minister’s powers to the prime minister, the latter does not answer to parliament on defence matters.\textsuperscript{75} In Libya, meanwhile, there is no defence minister at all.

Arab ministries of interior usually exercise considerably more political and functional control over internal security services – in contrast to defence ministries that act as little more than administrative appendages to the armed forces, disbursing salaries and managing pensions – but more often than not intelligence agencies report to the head of state, at times with the nominal involvement of the prime minister as in Jordan, where the director of Public Security also reports to King Abdullah II despite coming nominally under the ministry of interior.\textsuperscript{76} In Egypt General Intelligence similarly reports to President Mubarak, and in Algeria Securité Militaire to President Bouteflika, for example. It is common for intelligence chiefs to report to prime ministers or presidents in mature democracies too, but the key difference in the Arab region is the lack of any parliamentary checks and balances by which to hold the executive ultimately accountable.

As the preceding shows, Arab parliaments have little or no effective control over the security sector. Kuwait offers an impressive but solitary case of parliamentary oversight: the ministers of defence and interior answer to the National Assembly, the parliamentary Interior and Defence Affairs Committee also

\textsuperscript{74} Bonn International Center for Conversion, \textquoteleft Inventory of security sector reform (SSR) efforts in developing and transition countries: Near and Middle East\textquoteright, from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), pp. 4 and 9.\url{http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/GTZ}, And Volpi, \textquoteleft Democratisation and its Enemies\textquoteright, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{76} Tell, \textit{Jordanian Security Sector Governance}, p. 6.
questions ministers and top security officials including heads of intelligence, and, since 2002, has published an annual human rights report which has contained highly critical views and addressed allegations of torture, and in 1994 the Assembly compelled the government to reverse past practice and submit the defence and interior ministry budgets for parliamentary approval.\textsuperscript{77} Between 1996 and 2006 the Palestinian Legislative Council and its Financial Committee also questioned the Palestinian Authority’s council of ministers on occasion over the performance of the security sector and its expenditure – and on occasion received honest answers, as when then Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei’ and General Intelligence head Amin Hindi acknowledged that the security forces resorted to clan protection and engaged with criminal rackets at hearings held by the ‘Special Committee to Study the Political and Field Situation’ in July 2004 – but it was far more common for security commanders to refuse to appear at all.\textsuperscript{78}

Indeed, far more common in the Arab region is for parliaments to treat defence and security matters as taboo. The legislature most often lacks the constitutional mandate to question the executive over these matters or to require submission of even the most general defence budgets (let alone details of expenditure and procurement), but even the few that are constitutionally authorized to oversee budgets – in Egypt, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, and Yemen – prefer not to exercise their authority.\textsuperscript{79} The Jordanian parliament has the nominal power to approve the defence budget as a single item, without any detail, but its lack of a special committee with specific authority to discuss security weakens its effectiveness; even the detailed police budget it receives is somewhat ambiguous, and the intelligence budget is passed under the general budget confidentially by the prime minister.\textsuperscript{80} Other legislatures, such as the Libyan General People’s Congress, have no official control over any aspect or area of the security sector: expenditure on the police and internal security agencies of the regime is not recorded, the defence budget is reported but with few details and unreliable data, and the General People’s Committee (cabinet) has no control over the budget, and approves it as a pure formality.\textsuperscript{81}

In Arab countries that lack a legislature altogether, there are even fewer public safeguards and the executive has absolute leeway in setting policies, operational plans, and budgets. The consequence is a lack of proper budgeting and of fiscal controls and transparency. The Saudi Arabian defence budget, which is published without details, does not include all purchases of hardware and services, and has often been increased after publication; the actual cash flows and the value of oil used in major barter deals in exchange for arms are not reported and, along with the multi-layering of service and support contracts, compounds problems of financial transparency, resulting in waste and corruption and making planning impossible and ineffective.\textsuperscript{82}

In any case, the executive branch has proven effective in deflecting or pre-empting parliamentary scrutiny even where this is nominally allowed. As Ghanim al-Najjar notes, the parliamentary Interior and Defence Affairs Committee in Kuwait is packed with pro-government MPs, ensuring that it does


\textsuperscript{78}Appendix, Summary of the Special Committee Hearings, from Amin Hindi (15 July 2004, pp. 6 and 9) and Ahnad Qurei’ (17 July 2004, p. 13). [In Arabic.]


\textsuperscript{80}Tell, Jordanian Security Sector Governance, p. 7 and 10-11.

\textsuperscript{81}Mattes, Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East, pp. 11-12 and 27.

\textsuperscript{82}Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, The Saudi Security Apparatus, pp. 10 and 14.
not pose too formidable a challenge. Kuwait’s liberal politics mean that opposition MPs may still debate security matters openly in the media but this is extremely rare in the Arab region, where state censorship and repressive press laws severely restrict the scope for the development of a public debate. The Lebanese press resumed its tradition of free speech following the departure of Syrian troops and intelligence personnel in April 2005, openly discussing the possible involvement of certain security commanders and services in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, but is otherwise reluctant to conduct investigative reporting of the army, intelligence, or internal security agencies.

Much the same may be said of the Palestinian media: the principal daily al-Ayyam has carried critical articles and op-eds on the security forces and published special supplements on SSR, but these openings came only after the death of President Arafat and have remained erratic even since then. The Hamas administration committed itself openly in Summer 2007 to rebuilding “a new reality, new police, new security apparatus, a new, legitimate judiciary”, but by then the Palestinian Authority had split into two rival governments following the Hamas military takeover of Gaza. The paralysis of the Palestinian Legislative Council – with over one-third of its members in Israeli prisons since June 2006 and abstention of the Fatah bloc – has banished further thought of reforming the security sector, as such efforts have given way to the militarization of Palestinian politics and the visible inclination of both main parties to resort to coercive practices in handling opposition and domestic disputes.  

Furthermore, despite the absence of effective parliamentary challenges, executive branches in a number of Arab countries have taken security matters further out of public debate and scrutiny by establishing national security councils that are accountable only to heads of state. The Jordanian National Security Council is chaired by the king and comprises the prime minister, chief of the royal court, king’s national security advisor, army chief-of-staff, director of Public Security, and director of the General Intelligence Directorate; not having been formed through an act of law, it does not answer to parliament. In Kuwait a Supreme Council of Defence was set up in accordance with the constitution in 1963, but a later law in 1997 also decreed the formation of a new National Security Council as a security oversight and planning body. Although the membership of both bodies is almost identical, the latter’s meetings and decisions are kept secret; the fact that it deals with matters ranging from arms procurement to redrawing electoral constituencies suggests that it is a means of circumventing public scrutiny and control.

A similar duality has arisen in Morocco, where the king has established two bodies – Council for National Defense and Council for National Security – with poorly clarified powers and seemingly intended to impede oversight over national security policy. Arafat also used a National Security Council that lacked a clear legal mandate, formal procedures, and fixed membership to bypass demands for accountability and reform in the security sector from the cabinet, parliament, local NGOs, and international donors, and his

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83 See, for example, the special supplement on SSR prepared by Muwatin Institute for the Study of Civil Society, Parliamentary Horizons (Afaj), Vol. 11, No. 1, 27 February 2007. [In Arabic.] Non-governmental research institutes and advocacy organizations have been more pro-active than the press in this field: besides Muwatin, the most active are Aman and the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA).


85 Tell, Jordanian Security Sector Governance, p. 9.

86 Najjar: Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait, pp. 2 and 3.

87 Abdallah Saaf, ‘La question de la gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Maroc’, to be published in the journal ABHATH, Morocco.
successor Mahmoud Abbas resorted to the body again to bypass government control over the security sector after opposition movement Hamas won the general elections of January 2006. In other Arab countries more informal ‘parallel’ security commands exist: as noted previously, President al-Qadhafi heads the ‘revolutionary sector’ that monopolizes all effective command and control over the entire security sector in Libya, while the top Algerian military commanders, both active and retired, remain important decision-makers despite the relative autonomy that President Bouteflika has enjoyed since his re-election in 2004 and despite his creation of the post of Secretary General within the defense ministry to assert civilian authority.

**Capacity**

An overview of the Arab region shows that the striving of executive branches for exclusive, non-accountable control over the security sector has had problematic consequences for the latter’s capacity. There have been efforts to upgrade and modernize certain security services when this has served the interest and policy priorities of heads of state and ruling elites, but even when technical proficiency has improved, this has rarely extended across the security sector and performance has remained erratic for the most part. Overall in the Arab region, the security sector suffers poor functional differentiation between the various services, with overlapping mandates and duplication of roles, proliferation of organizations and chains of command, and massive inflation of personnel numbers and payrolls, leading to ineffective performance and financial inefficiency.

To take the first of a few examples, the Moroccan internal security apparatus comprises several overlapping police and paramilitary organizations: the National Police, Mobile Intervention Corps, National Intelligence Service (DST), Auxiliary Forces, which are all part of the ministry of interior, while the Royal Gendarmerie, which reports to the defence ministry, is responsible for law enforcement in rural areas and on national highways. In Lebanon, the army formally acquired an important primary role in assisting internal security following the end of the civil war in 1990 – a role played by several other Arab armies – while the internal security and domestic intelligence services increased in number to six – adding the Bureau d’Intelligence, Direction Générale de la Sécurité de l’État, Presidential Guard, Government Guard, and Airport Security Service to the longstanding and ubiquitous Deuxième Bureau.

Although it was only established in 1994, the Palestinian Authority quickly became notorious for the proliferation and redundancy of its dozen security services, following a model established since the 1970s in Syria and elsewhere. In Saudi Arabia, where King Abdullah, Defence Minister Khalid bin Sultan, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abdul-Aziz each heads his own intelligence service, coordination of policy, planning, and budgets across the armed forces, national guard, and internal security is “tenuous at best”, and the problem is compounded because other princes who are provincial governors also play a major role in shaping security policy at the local level. In Libya there are arguably no horizontal ties at all between security organizations, only vertical ones leading to

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the ‘revolutionary sector’ and more specifically to Qadhafi.\footnote{Mattes, Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East, p. 19.}

The proliferation of security organizations has naturally been accompanied by a significant inflation in personnel numbers. The Palestinian security sector reached a strength of nearly 87,000 in a population of 3.5 million in early 2007, not counting up to 13,000 men recruited by the Hamas government, while the Lebanese army, Internal Security Force, and Deuxième Bureau alone accounted for 125,000 in a population of 4 million.\footnote{Belloncle, ‘Prospects of SSR in Lebanon’, pp. 6, 9, and 10-12.} In Libya, with a similar population, the police are estimated to number 30,000-50,000, but organizations ‘safeguarding the revolution’, which play a more important internal security role, include the Revolutionary Committees with an estimated strength of 60,000 in 2002 and the People’s Resistance Forces or People’s Militia, a territorial home guard entrusted with protecting public buildings that numbered 45,000 at its foundation in 1974 and has grown since then.\footnote{Mattes, Challenges to Security Sector Governance in the Middle East, pp. 4, 6, and 15.}

Iraq, which has seen an explosive proliferation of security services due to the combination of fighting an insurgency and incorporating diverse societal interests, had a police force of 120,000 by summer 2004 (30,000 above target) and a total of 230,000 in September 2007 (besides another 104,000 in other internal security services and 140,000 in the Facilities Protection Service), compared to 60,000 under former President Saddam Hussein.\footnote{Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector p. 46; and The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, pp. 93 and 94.} In Algeria another government battling insurgents has built up government-sponsored, semi-independent paramilitary forces, with similar effects: self-defence militias number up to 200,000, and there are 80,000 communal guards.\footnote{Bonn International Center for Conversion, ‘Security Sector Reform in Algeria’, from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), p. 6. http://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/} The construction of a parallel security apparatus outside the ministry of interior reporting directly to Tunisian President Zein-el-Abidin Ben Ali and paid out of a ‘black’ fund has led to uncontrolled growth in the sector, and dramatically expanded the mukhabarat (though numbers are not known), while in Jordan the police and intelligence services have grown to compensate for decreases in the armed forces mandated by the IMF.\footnote{On Algeria, BICC, ‘Inventory of security sector reform’, p. 20. On Jordan, Qatarneh, ‘Security Sector Reform’, p. 8.}

There are concrete reasons for the patterns described above. The overlapping of functions between the military and the police – and the tendency for the police to be militarized in terms of structure, training, armament, ranks, and operational procedures – derives from the historical roots of numerous Arab police forces, which originally formed part of a single defense force, before being separated administratively and organizationally. Coup-proofing is another reason: incumbent regimes have fragmented and divided their security sectors since the early 1970s in order to reduce potential threats. In both monarchical and republican Arab systems, loyalty, redundancy, competition, and cronyism are preferred over competence, performance, synergy, integration, and interoperability.\footnote{Laipson et al, Security Sector Reform in the Gulf, p. 11.}

The consequences include duplication of roles, structural disinclination to inter-service coordination, and bloated payrolls, as noted previously, severely debilitating capacity in the security sector across the region. Ironically, an additional consequence is serious under-staffing in branches that are most important to ‘human security’ and citizens’ welfare, even as regular and paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies...
are often vastly over-size. Sudan offers an example that is admittedly shaped by its legacy of protracted conflict, but no less telling for that: it has only 5,000 police in its five southern regions whereas 38,000 or more are required, 500 prison wardens of an estimated 4,800 needed, and only 22 of 750 judges envisaged under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended its long-running civil war in 2005. More broadly, the result in many Arab countries is to deepen the security dilemma, widening the gap between elite and societal notions of security, inhibiting change in repressive security cultures, and inhibiting more effective and mutually rewarding cooperation between state, civil society, and security actors.

Cooperation

Western SSR literature emphasizes cooperation as a necessary element both because it provides means of enhancing effectiveness and performance, and because it encourages adherence to common professional and normative standards. Given the underdeveloped state of SSR in the Arab region it makes sense to deepen the concept of cooperation: if is to reflect pluralist democratic norms, enhance the notion of human security, and encompass interactions between a wide range of domestic and international actors and counterparts, then what is required is significant reorientation of security organizations in terms of how they understand and pursue their core missions. In other words, cooperation is fundamentally about developing a new security culture. Globalization makes this ever more important as states face new, cross-border or transnational threats amidst accelerating economic privatization, cultural interaction, and social migration.

The first and foremost challenge to conceptualizing SSR in most of the Arab region is to define state security, rather than regime security, as the central mission and raison d’être of the security sector. As Laipson has most recently reiterated, ruling elites often regard security sectors as an extension of their power, loyal to them rather than to some notion of state or citizenship. The result of privileging regime survival has often been to undermine national and regional security. Examples abound: the GCC was unable to deter or counter the occupation of a member-state, Kuwait, in 1990; Libya only seriously considered military reform following the setbacks to its adventures in Chad; and Saddam Hussein led Iraq into three ruinous wars in the quest for internal regime consolidation.

The consequences for democratic norms and human security have been no less adverse: most Arab governments are accustomed to operating under “an established protocol” of heavy reliance on blunt security instruments against political opponents, critics, and ordinary citizens voicing complaints. This is an example of “defensive-mindedness”, the label used by Alexander Golts and Tonya Putnam to describe a cluster of mutually-reinforcing political and cultural attitudes that continue to underpin the culture of Russian militarism long after the Soviet system that generated it had collapsed.

A particularly important and practical expression of the conceptual and cultural change needed in the Arab region would be to demilitarize internal security and police forces, and to enhance their capacity so as to enable the regular armed forces to be reoriented exclusively to the provision of external security. Drawing on the Latin American experience of the 1980s to show

102 ‘Prospects for Middle East Security-Sector Reform’, p. 100.
how important this is, Arthur Costa and Mateus Medeiros identify the need for changes in organization, training, deployment, control, intelligence, and justice, while arguing that the critical distinction is in how internal and external security services deploy force.\(^{105}\) Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian public security forces present concrete examples of militarization in these respects, as does the Central Security Force in Egypt, but similar blurring of distinctions is common in the paramilitary bodies (such as gendarmeries and national guards) that straddle the divide between supporting armed forces and enforcing law and order outside capital cities in several other Arab countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia.\(^{106}\) In several instances the gendarmeries come under the ministry of defence, forming an integral part of the armed forces and applying military organization and regulations. In Morocco, for example, the 20,000-strong gendarmerie — that has its own mobile forces, paratroopers, coast guard, special intervention forces, and intelligence — is tied directly to the king via the Royal Military Court, and is set by him against the Royal Armed Forces in a deliberate unbalancing policy.\(^{107}\)

Demilitarization and functional differentiation are especially important for Arab governments engaging in political liberalization. Significantly, meaningful steps towards SSR have only been taken by governments undertaking democratization, however limited: the restoration of parliament and implementation of greater accountability in the security sector went hand in hand in Kuwait in the 1990s, the creation of the post of minister of interior and attempts to pass basic laws governing the security sector in the Palestinian Authority coincided with the greater assertiveness of the legislature from 2002 onwards, direct challenges to President Emile Lahoud’s influence over the security sector and to several key commanders in Lebanon only took place with the ‘cedar revolution’ of Spring 2005, and modest steps to improve respect for human rights by the security forces and assert civilian control in Algeria followed its first genuinely contested presidential election in April 2004. One of the more impressive instances of the opening of a public debate on the security sector is Morocco, where the Equity and Reconciliation Commission has allowed frank examination of the sector’s past practices and the press has spoken out about scandals involving the theft of weapons or complicity of local security commanders in human trafficking.\(^{108}\)

Yet these openings have been both limited and rare; apparent liberalization has just as often been accompanied by an increase in executive powers, as witnessed in Egypt and Jordan since 1995 and 1999 respectively, and the security sector has remained a key element of regime power even when the latter “moves into civilian dress and lifts martial law”, as the cases of Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia also reveal. That these moves are reversible, or may be subverted in other ways, is demonstrated in the Egyptian case, where the government established a national council for human rights that has actually mentioned use of torture in prisons in its annual report, but where the lifting of martial law was immediately followed by an anti-terrorism law that is even harsher. Even where executive power has not increased, as in the case of a relatively non-authoritarian system such as the UAE, the introduction of human rights training for police officers proved was


limited to those dealing with cases involving violence against women, and proved to be a one-off that was not extended to the rest of the police force.

The continuing resilience of authoritarian political systems and cultures, backed by extensive security sectors, explains the painfully slow and partial nature of such improvements as have occurred in the Arab region with respect to human rights, penal and judicial reform, and truth and reconciliation efforts dealing with past abuses. Libya, Algeria, and Morocco are among the Arab countries that have undertaken initiatives to improve the rule of law in recent years – whether by legislating formal bans on the use of torture, introducing human rights training for security personnel, or acting to end extrajudicial killings and ‘disappearances’ by police and security forces – but this is by no means to say that the civilian government in any of these cases is now able to subject the military, police, or other security agencies routinely to political control and legal accountability.109 Civilian authorities are unable to ensure respect for the protections provided under penal codes and abuses have continued, and in some cases increased, as international reports state of the use of torture by the Algerian security services.110 Given that the security and justice sectors in these three countries have benefited from EU assistance in recent years, it is apposite to recall the warnings of Laipson, Hendrickson, and others that SSR may bolster authoritarianism when its focus is on military modernization or narrow professionalization rather than efforts to strengthen rule of law and democratic control.111

Similarly, the formal abolition of state security courts in a few countries, most notably Egypt in 2003 and Libya in 2004, has not led to meaningful change in security culture, nor been matched by others: Jordan and Tunisia still try civilians in special security or military courts, and Morocco actually modified its penal code in 2000 to allow serious security cases (involving terrorism, threats to the monarchy, or advocating independence for the Western Sahara) to be brought before specially constituted military tribunals.112 And, although Algeria and Morocco led the way in 2003 and 2004 respectively in forming commissions dealing with past human rights abuses by official security agencies – responsible for the disappearance of 7,000-12,000 people during the civil war in the former, and for 16,000 victims of unlawful incarceration or torture in the latter – these bodies lack statutory power to compel officers to give testimony or release documents, let alone indict or sentence them.113 Indeed, the “Decree Implementing the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” passed by the Algerian cabinet headed by the president on 27 February 2006, bypassing parliament, in effect granted a sweeping amnesty for all security force members for all acts committed during the civil conflict and effectively criminalized public debate or individual and collective claims against the security forces for human rights violations, and seriously reduced the scope to challenge such abuses through legal means.114

113 BICC, ‘Security Sector Reform in Algeria’, p. 5; and BICC, ‘Security Sector Reform in Morocco’, p. 5.
Improvements have not only been slow and partial, however. Emerging trends since 9/11 suggest they are also reversible. Arnold Luethold argues that the emergence of terrorism as a significant threat is the main reason for external (and internal) pressures on Arab security sectors to develop a wide new range of skills and capabilities; often Western-assisted, these include the training of special anti-terror units, tighter control of money flows, information sharing, and better coordination. This shift in threat perception may act as the single most important factor driving SSR in the Arab region for years to come, but it may also lead to repressive and non-democratic behaviour by ruling elites and their security sectors.\(^{115}\) It has driven new anti-terror legislation and the creation of new, counter-terror security formations and police rapid reaction forces in a number of Arab countries, as well as intensified efforts against Islamist infiltration of security forces, an increased role for the military, redefinition of security tasks and responsibilities, concentration of intelligence information, new equipment purchases and increased budgets, and the creation of off-limits security zones. The extent and direction of the transformation of the security landscape are not yet fully clear, but appear likely to complicate SSR.

A similar dynamic is driving the growth of indigenous private security companies, most notably in Iraq, where their role and that of the police have become almost indistinguishable, but also prominently in Saudi Arabia, where oil facilities are guarded by 30,000 men (adding $750mn to its internal security budget of $5.5bn), and in a steadily growing number of other Arab countries.\(^{116}\) Ironically, the Iraqi case underlines the fact that some governments resort to private security companies because they distrust the professional competence of their own official security services, which only reduces the incentives to reform or upgrade them.\(^{117}\) Yet the fact that private security companies are expected to operate in an environment characterized by the very lack or weakness of legislative, judicial, and other regulatory frameworks, political controls, and professional standards that so besets the official security sector, only harbours new problems of accountability for the future.

**The security sector in the state-society relationship**

The preceding sections have surveyed the main political and structural obstacles to SSR in the Arab region. This section adds a further dimension by considering the position of the security sector in the state-society relationship, assessing in particular the impact of its inter-weaving with social cleavages and communal politics and of its involvement in the political economy on the development of a domestically-driven SSR agenda in Arab countries.

In the first instance, the composition and formation of numerous Arab security forces are shaped by the sectarian, ethnic, or factional divisions of their wider social and political contexts, which have indeed been determining factors in state formation and affect institutional dynamics throughout all sectors of government. In Lebanon the creation of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité de l’Etat in the early 1990s by the Shi’a Muslim speaker of parliament was interpreted as an attempt to acquire a foothold in the security sector for his community; Hezbollah is believed to have gained

significant influence within Military Intelligence and control over the Airport Security Service; and former Prime Minister Hariri was seen as having made the Internal Security Forces, and especially the recently-formed Bureau d’Intelligence, a bastion of Sunni Muslims.  

A significant proportion of the 140,000 men of the Facilities Protection Service in Iraq owe allegiance to political parties, tribes, and clans, and particularly to the Army of the Mahdi militia led by Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, while the Badr Brigade has heavily penetrated the National Police; the Basra-based “Fadhila, which controls the Oil Protection Force – the unit responsible for safeguarding wells, refineries and pipelines – essentially is in charge of the oil infrastructure”, and the “small Hizbollah party has a strong presence in the Customs Police Force”.

In Palestine political factionalism led to a near-identity of membership in Fatah and several of the security services that were constructed after 1994; these have also experienced a ‘re-tribalization’ as clan allegiances have revived amidst insecurity and chaos since 2000. Re-tribalization has also occurred in the Libyan security sector since the 1980s as the regime faced domestic dissent, a pattern also long familiar in Iraq, Syria, and Sudan, not to mention Saudi Arabia where historic tribal and family ties with the royal family influence recruitment into senior security command positions. In Algeria, clan- and family-based interests came to play a major role in the village self-

defence militias that the army sponsored during the civil war; having quickly become involved in the informal economy and protection rackets, and used their arms to wage internecine feuds, they have also proven largely impossible to disarm and disband. So intricate is the weave between social and security formations that SSR may undermine not only the foundations of political power but also national cohesion and state survival – especially in a state such as Syria with suppressed, but no less deep, social cleavages – a threatening prospect used by incumbents to resist change altogether.

Second, security organizations are actively involved in a range of both legal and illegal commercial activities in many Arab countries. The range is wide. In Egypt the military runs a large defence industry, but also operates in the agricultural, tourist, real estate, and manufacturing sectors and actively competes in the civilian economy; although its activities are legal, they are not subject to outside audit, and it neither reveals its turnover and profits, including from exports, nor pays taxes. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the widely reputed involvement of Syrian military, customs, and internal security agencies and commanders in cross-border smuggling and undeclared business partnerships, both inside Syria and in neighbouring countries. Indeed, the existence of networks connecting Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia is an important element of the regional ‘black’ political economy that has arisen involving security sectors, clans, and criminal groups, and is replicated to varying degrees across borders between Yemen and its neighbours, and among the Maghrebi countries. In the absence of effective governance of the security sector, its involvement in illegal and criminal trafficking only increases, rather than reduces, social, economic, and political insecurity.

This pattern is partly compounded by the...
opacity of security budgets and spending throughout the region, and by the permeability between political and economic decision-making. The tendency not to rotate or retire senior officers, in order to reward their loyalty, often allows them to turn their posts into sinecures that they use for profit, while in countries such as Yemen and Sudan an informal and partly kin-based circle of state managers and security commanders have built large commercial empires in the form of officially-registered ‘economic cooperation’ organizations or boards. These patterns are also fuelled, finally, by the crony, predatory nature of economic liberalization and privatization in some of the ‘partly-free’ Arab countries, where the security sector has emerged as the de facto ‘political and business partner and electoral enforcer of a ‘contested’ democratic regime’, to borrow Luckham’s phrase.124

The preceding has a number of implications for SSR. First, to borrow again from Luckham, “When ethnic patronage is built into military, police, and security bureaucracies it corrupts them, weakens discipline, reinforces a sense of impunity and fosters public (and especially minority) distrust of the state itself”.125 Conversely, as Bellamy adds, pursuing genuine SSR, especially in parallel to meaningful liberalization, may foster instability by dissolving the patrimonial glue that binds political systems. Second, the particular nature of state-society relations in many Arab countries confirms Chanaa’s observation that, although it is fashionable to talk about privileging ‘local ownership’ and a civil society role in SSR, there is very little clarity on what this means practically. Rather, as she concludes, it reveals the ‘multiplicity of security orders’; 126 this is likely to increase in complexity as liberalization and privatization proceed, further undermining the political order and coherence of the state.

Third, the Arab case highlights the observations by Chuter that the civil and security domains are not entirely separate conceptually and practically, and that the socially mediated linkages between them will greatly influence how SSR is approached and may be carried out in individual countries. SSR will be to the advantage of some social and political actors, but, by the same token, to the disadvantage of others, and so its design and conduct will necessarily be interpreted as moves in a domestic political game.127 Fourth, Luckham concludes from these various intertwinings that the security sector should not be seen as coherent and unified – as a ‘sector’, that is – but instead as a shifting ‘terrain’ of security coalitions that are assembled and reassembled as crises occur or reform takes place. This is correct, but the concentration of political and ‘infrastructural’ power in much of the Arab region suggests that such coalitional politics are most likely to take place within a relatively narrow circle of key stakeholders, especially in authoritarian regimes, but also in semi-liberal ones.

Conclusion

The centrality of security sectors to state formation and to the state-society relationship and their de facto political and, occasionally, economic partnerships with ruling elites in many Arab countries suggest that pursuing SSR presents an arduous task. SSR must be domestically-driven, and yet ‘local ownership’ of the process is least likely precisely where it is most needed.128 The fact that SSR requires the cooperation of those who stand to lose most from it, as Smith argues, only underlines the sombre conclusion drawn by Laurie Nathan, that the “sheer number of policies that have to be

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125 Ibid., p. 22.
126 Chanaa, Security Sector Reform, pp. 9 and 46.
128 Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, p. 39.
transformed, the fact that these policies have to be changed more or less simultaneously, and the potentially radical nature of the transformation agenda easily overcomes the best-intentioned reform’. And yet the same practitioners warn that anything less than a comprehensive approach to SSR may increase insecurity rather than security.

These problems are by no means limited to the Arab region, but perhaps it is not so surprising, then, that external actors have limited the political capital and the financial and human resources they will commit to promoting SSR in Arab countries. With the exception of Iraq and Palestine, where it has adopted a pro-active ‘restructurist’ policy, the US has more generally taken a hand-off stance towards SSR in the rest of the region, while the EU has adopted a gradual, ‘bottom-up’ ‘reformist’ approach focusing principally on human rights. Yet even in this respect, Western efforts are largely based on the transfer of expertise through training, rather than political initiatives to bring security sectors under democratic control. Richard Youngs correctly criticizes both approaches for failing to understand the ‘essential nature of autocratic rule and precarious status of liberal rights that are not underpinned by genuinely open politics’ in most Arab countries, while Andrew Rathmell draws on the Iraqi case to conclude unequivocally that ‘training of individuals in new skills, is of limited value if the higher levels are not also addressed… Overall progress can only be made by addressing the political environment, the legal and regulatory frameworks, the interface with other government structures, and the organizational development of the [relevant] ministry’.  

In this context, the critical conclusion reached by Hendrickson is particularly applicable: Western actors are actually disengaging, rather than engaging, with genuine SSR. In fairness, no amount of donor-supplied technical assistance and expertise is likely to show benefits in the absence of domestic political will, but equally, as he further argues, aid provided in the absence of a clear overall policy framework may actually help entrench illiberal attitudes.

Advocates of Arab SSR therefore face a difficult challenge if they are to progress towards any of the key reform aims, let alone all of them. Broadly, these are to: a) achieve the disengagement of security agencies from politics and from other non-security roles (especially economic), b) redefine and differentiate the roles of various security branches (especially separating military or external defence from internal security, and setting clear substantive and procedural rules for the deployment of armed forces for internal security in extraordinary circumstances), c) reinforce the civilian policy-making role, re-professionalize the security services (in terms of its skills, systems and ethos), d) restructure the security sector in post-conflict cases (Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and arguably Yemen), e) strengthen regional frameworks for cooperation, and f) manage relations with outside providers of security-related assistance. Achieving these aims further requires strengthening of civilian oversight institutions, institutionalization of mechanisms to develop security policy and identify security needs, training civil servants in control and accounting systems for budgets and expenditure planning, and enhancing the capacity of civil society to monitor and assess

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132 European Policies for Middle East Reform, p. 8; Rathmell, *Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces*, p. 5.
134 These are an adaptation of the list in *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*, UK Department for International Development, 2002, p. 15. See Appendix 2.
reforms.\textsuperscript{134}

Just how any of these aims may be achieved, and in what order, will vary from one Arab country to another, as “the provision of justice and security is based upon historical legacies, cultural value systems, political calculations and intricate balances of power”, in the words of the 2007 DAC report on \textit{Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery}, which represents the ‘state of the art’ in current donor approaches to SSR. However, the report also stresses that, in all cases, “the state has an irreducible role in the delivery and accountability of justice and security. At the very least, this role includes setting minimum standards, formulating policy and legal frameworks, developing varying types of accountability mechanisms, upholding the principles of human rights, and establishing networks and partnerships among service providers”.\textsuperscript{135} Security is a public good, and for that reason good governance and social inclusiveness are critical in providing governments with the legitimacy to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their security sectors, something that technical training and technological upgrades alone cannot provide. What this further underlines is the need to situate all discussion of SSR within a broader debate about the meaning and practices of security, and in particular the question of whose security is being provided. Ultimately, the principal challenge is for Arab states to develop comprehensive national security policies that are responsive to citizens’ needs.

Clearly, there are additional challenges, among them the need to manage non-statutory armed actors – including those formed or sponsored by governments – that have emerged as a consequence of the decline of social pacts and the privatization of security. There will always be competing priorities, not only within SSR, but also within government as a whole, since most of skills and resources needed to improve governance and performance in the former are often in short supply and badly needed in the latter as well. Convincing state managers, senior officers and civil servants, and society of the benefits of reform is no less demanding a task, but essential if pro-reform coalitions are to be built. There is moreover the constant risk of regression, as elements of the security sector seek to regain powers and privileges or to reinvent these in other forms.\textsuperscript{136} Yet there can be no alternative if old habits in many Arab security sectors – brutality, passivity, politicization, and corruption – are to be replaced with an ethos of discipline, integrity, and leadership.\textsuperscript{137} The tentative steps towards public debate that have appeared in some Arab countries, along with multilateral initiatives such as the UNDP’s Programme on Governance in the Arab Region and its new series of Arab Human Development Reports focusing on ‘human security’, offer some hope that SSR, even though resisted, will appear increasingly on the public agenda.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[135] \textit{Op cit}, p. 6. The report is intended to provide a broad implementation framework for OECD members who are interested in working on SSR and harmonizing their activities in this domain. It focuses on fragile or collapsed states, but many of its conclusions are pertinent here, even though it omits any mention of the Arab region, except for Sudan and Somalia.
\item[136] Difficulties noted by Chanaa, \textit{Security Sector Reform}, pp. 46-47.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Appendix 1 – Development Advisory Committee Categories of SSR-related activities


1. Political and Policy Dialogue and Initiatives: Activities aimed at improving civil-security force relations, increasing civilian input into security policymaking, and preparing the terrain for reform. This can include confidence-building activities between civilians and security force personnel.
2. Armed Forces and Intelligence: Activities aimed at improving governance of the armed forces, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces and other reserve or local defense units that support military functions, provide border security and so on.
3. Justice and Internal Security Apparatus: Activities involving police functions, prisons, courts, secret services, and civilian internal intelligence agencies.
4. Non-state Security Forces: Activities involving private security companies and other irregular security bodies which enjoy a degree of public authority and legitimacy that is not derived from the state itself or legal status: political party militias/security forces, local militias, bodyguard units, and so on.
5. Civil Oversight Mechanisms: Activities involving formal mechanisms – such as the legislature, legislative select committees, auditors general, police commissions, human rights commissions – and informal mechanism – such as civil society “watchdog” organizations, and customary authorities.
6. Civil Management Bodies: Activities aimed at strengthening functions for financial management, planning and execution; security policy development; personnel management and the like found in finance, defense, internal affairs and justice ministries, president/prime minister’s offices, national security advisory bodies and the like.
7. Civilian Capacity Building: Activities aimed at general capacity building/education initiatives that do not fit into the civil management and oversight categories, including activities designed to build capacity of civil society groups seeking to analyze and influence security policy and increase public literacy on security issues, academic or other training courses on security issues.
8. Regional Initiatives: Activities involving the role of foreign affairs ministries/peacemaking initiatives, and formal mechanisms such as defense treaties/pacts, regional security bodies for dealing with defense, criminal, intelligence issues and the like.
9. Initiatives to Demilitarize Society: Activities in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, with particular attention for child soldiers, small arms and light weapons and others.
Appendix 2 - Key political and policy choices in SSR


The main political challenges are:

- **military disengagement from politics** – developing political strategies and constitutional dispensations to facilitate the withdrawal of the military from a formal political role and prevent excessive influence over the political process;
- **military disengagement from other non-military roles** – the military very often plays significant economic, political and social roles beyond its traditional security remit. This can damage military professionalism, although some of these activities have other benefits.
- **redefinition of security roles** – getting the military out of inappropriate internal security roles and ensuring there is appropriate legislation, political backing and funding to enable the police to fulfill its role effectively.
- **civilian policy-making role** – creating the bureaucratic structures and human capacities and skills to enable the civilian policy sectors to contribute effectively to the formulation of security policy;
- **re-professionalisation of the military** – developing a complementary set of skills, systems and an ethos within the military so that it can interact effectively with civilian counterparts and fulfil its security functions effectively.
- **military restructuring and demobilization** – after wars, merging guerrilla forces and/or civil defense or local militia forces into national armies, redefining the armed forces’ role and mission, and ‘right-sizing’ them to meet the new political environment;
- **regional frameworks for peace** – strengthening regional confidence-building measures to ensure the sustainability of peace agreements, to reduce regional instability (which contributes to the maintenance of large standing armies and elevated levels of military spending), and to prevent conflicts from spreading across national boundaries;
- **managing relations with donors** – ensuring that international assistance is consistent with national needs and priorities, and that aid conditionality does not undermine national policymaking processes.
Appendix 3 – Internationally recognized principles for external support for SSR


1. adopt a broad definition of the security sector;
2. situate SSR in the context of providing a secure environment for people;
3. recognize that all countries can benefit to varying degrees from SSR;
4. foster local ownership of reform processes;
5. develop comprehensive frameworks for promoting SSR and assist reforming countries to develop their own frameworks;
6. build capacity to undertake SSR in reforming countries;
7. adopt a long-term approach;
8. adopt a regional/sub-regional perspective.
## GLOSSARY

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Advisory Committee (OECD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EIHDR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EU-COPPS</td>
<td>EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>MEDA</td>
<td>EC Assistance Program for Mediterranean Countries</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Program</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USSC</td>
<td>US Security Coordinator (occupied Palestinian territories)</td>
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